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Reframing Inter-American 
Relations*
 
Richard Feinberg, Emily Miller and Harold Trinkunas1
Realizing Core Interests and Recognizing Successes
Since the George W. Bush administration, the dominant narrative 
among observers of United States relations with Latin America2 has 
been one of retreat and decline. This alleged decay is attributed to 
either a lack of attention from the United States, or alternatively to 
active—even treacherous—efforts by other powers such as Brazil and 
China to push the United States out of the region. As a result, U.S. 
interests are described as suffering, and some portray the region as 
falling into the hands of hostile forces.3 Among such critics, recent 
D O C U M E N T
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Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
2
264
 policy initiatives by the Obama administration on immigration and 
Cuba policy are greeted as welcome but overdue and possibly fleeting 
signs of attention to a neglected regional relationship.
Yet each of these pessimistic assessments underestimates the present state 
of U.S.-Latin America relations. Latin America and the United States are 
deeply intertwined demographically and economically. Politically, the 
fact that recent U.S. administrations have focused greater attention 
elsewhere in the world is logical and smart—U.S. core interests in 
Latin America are well protected relative to those in conflict-ridden 
regions such as the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Properly un-
derstood, the relationship of the United States with Latin America 
in its many manifestations remains deep and adequate for the era 
in which we live. But the instruments of effective U.S. influence have 
evolved, and analysts err when they expect the United States to exert 
its influence in outmoded—and quite possibly counterproductive—
ways. Furthermore, the old instruments were never as potent as some 
nostalgically imagine. 
We take core U.S. interests in Latin America to be: (1) progressive, 
resilient political democracies with respect for human rights; (2) rea-
sonably well- managed, market-oriented economies open to global 
trade and investment; (3) inter-state peace among nations; and (4) 
the absence of credible threats to the United States from international 
terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. We define core interests 
as those conditions which enhance the safety and wellbeing of the 
United States and which are universally applicable to U.S. foreign rela-
tions.4 Along these four indicators, U.S. core interests have never 
been stronger—especially in the two regional powers that account 
for nearly two-thirds of Latin America’s population and gross domestic 
product (GDP), Mexico and Brazil. This is also true throughout much 
of the rest of South America, the Caribbean and Central America. 
While there has been some regression on democracy, human rights or 
markets in a limited number of states, such backsliding remains the 
exception rather than the rule. In particularly troubled polities, such 
as Argentina and Venezuela, we will argue that the present turmoil is 
largely the product of poor policy choices by governing elites and an 
end to a decade-long commodity boom, rather than emblematic of 
the state of U.S.-Latin American relations.
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There are other desirable objectives that Latin American countries wish 
to achieve, such as greater social inclusion and reductions in extraordi-
narily high rates of violent crime, particularly in Central America and 
the Caribbean. These are goals that broadly align with U.S. values. But 
we should be careful to distinguish between core interests and values. 
When Latin America addresses its own core interests, the United States 
should certainly wish them well (and consider assisting them when 
asked) should this align with our values. But Latin America’s progress 
on achieving its own interests should not be a measure of whether U.S. 
core interests are preserved.
Similarly, a mistake many observers of U.S.-Latin American relations 
have made is to expect that positive outcomes in the region on econo-
mic, political, trade and international security matters readily translate 
into a common agenda for joint action in global and hemispheric 
affairs. Rather, well-managed, stable, peaceful and successful Latin Ame-
rican countries are by and large free to pursue their own interests in the 
present global order. Happily, these interests often coincide with those of 
the United States. But we should expect them to differ frequently, given 
that Latin American and Caribbean experiences—historical, political 
and geostrategic—vary in many significant respects from those of the 
United States. Similarly, we are often faced with a lack of support for 
some of our global policies by other generally friendly states, such as 
Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa 
and Turkey. In fact, if we look at indicators such as voting in the United 
Nations General Assembly, all major regions of the world have shown in-
creased independence from U.S. positions since the end of the Cold 
War.5 Rather than expect that the United States and Latin America 
will agree because they share democratic and market values, we should 
instead look forward to U.S.-Latin American relations that resemble those 
that the United States enjoys with its other global allies and partners. 
What are some of the key characteristics of a mature inter-state rela-
tionship in the 21st century? We should not find it desirable for the 
United States to employ leverage to manipulate the outcomes of the 
democratic procedures of our allies and partners. Rather, in recogni-
zing long-term shared interests, we should attempt to find areas to work 
together for mutual gain. This means building multilateral institutions 
and rules, asserting and defending common values and creating public 
goods. As with our allies and partners in Europe and Asia, we should 
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find ways to confront global governance challenges by working together 
with Latin America. And we can hope that common initiatives, such as 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, will favorably (but indirectly) alter the 
“behind-the-border” political economy in our Latin American trade 
partners to create broader constituencies for closer relations. This is 
the type of relationship that U.S. diplomacy should aim to produce 
across Latin America.
Looking Backward
Some who focus on the alleged loss of U.S. influence harken back to 
a bygone era when (they imagine) the U.S. foreign policy arsenal held 
a panoply of powerful instruments with which to bend the will 
of relatively weak neighbors. The United States never possessed the 
degree of leverage alleged by some U.S. and many Latin American 
analysts.6 But the asymmetries of state power and capabilities were 
wide enough to allow U.S. policymakers to work their will—in concert 
with local allies—on significant occasions.
U.S. leverage in Latin America was at an apogee from the 1940s 
through the 1980s. During World War II, the hemisphere mostly 
aligned with Washington in the struggle against the Axis powers, and 
nations welcomed U.S. military installations on their soils. Brazil sent 
an army division to fight in the Italian campaign, and Mexico con-
tributed an air force unit. Latin America served as a major source 
of commodities to fuel the Allied war effort.7 When the United States 
emerged victorious, Latin America saw it as the overwhelming glo-
bal and regional hegemon. And when U.S. influence appeared to 
be waning in the wake of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Kennedy 
administration initiated the Alliance for Progress, together with allies 
in Latin America, as a large-scale, multi-pronged program of bilateral 
and multilateral economic and security assistance.8
During these heady decades, instruments of U.S. policy included: 
(1) financial resources including bilateral and multilateral assistance 
as positive inducements when offered and negative sanctions when 
withheld; (2) economic policy advice; (3) security assistance in-
cluding arms transfers and military training, counter-narcotics and 
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other anti-crime programs; (4) covert interventions to bolster friends 
and in some cases overturn regimes; (5) perceptions of the United 
States as the regional hegemon, often of exaggerated proportions, which 
enhanced leverage; and (6) overt military intervention, employed exclu-
sively in the smaller countries in the Caribbean basin (the Dominican 
Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989).9
U.S. Economic Leverage
At the height of the Alliance for Progress, U.S. foreign assistance peaked 
at $5.2 billion in 1964 (in constant 2011 US$), which amounted to 
0.6 percent of the region’s GDP and an even higher percentage in 
some of the smaller countries.10 When combined with flows from the 
international financial institutions (IFIs, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank), and coordinated by the U.S. Treasury Department, the leve-
rage could be substantial.11
By the 1980s, U.S. bilateral assistance had already declined to under 
0.2 percent of the region’s GDP (and today it is well under 0.1 per-
cent). But the severe debt crisis of the 1980s, which left many countries 
without foreign exchange reserves, caused the region to turn to the 
IFIs—sometimes backed by short-term but vital currency swaps 
from the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board—for large-scale 
capital injections and formal debt rescheduling. As an influential 
member of the IFIs with a substantial voting share, the United States 
had a significant say in how the multilateral institutions approached 
Latin America. Financial rescue packages were conditioned upon 
economic restructuring programs that effectively dismantled the 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) programs inspired by 
Latin America’s experiences during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
In the 1990s, Latin American capitals adopted the “Washington 
Consensus” of macroeconomic stability (balanced fiscal budgets and 
restrained monetary policies) and more open trade and investment 
regimes. To many, it appeared as though Washington was taking 
advantage of Latin American weakness to impose its will; however, 
the neoliberal economic reforms were supported by many on the 
center and center-right in Latin America who recognized that the ISI 
strategies had run their course.12   They were in turn implemented 
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by enthusiastic Latin American technocrats, often trained at leading 
U.S. graduate schools.13
The Washington Consensus has since fallen out of favor in Latin 
America, and the international community has learned that such far-
reaching reforms are best implemented with broad popular support and 
when tailored to specific local contexts. Over the past decade, competent 
central banks and finance ministries have vastly improved macroeco-
nomic management across the region, and Latin America’s economic 
performance has improved markedly. Far from operating in the red and 
desperately seeking external assistance, many Latin America countries 
have accumulated handsome levels of reserves and favorable balances 
of trade. There is nothing like a comfortable portfolio of external 
assets to give a country a sense of well-being and of relative autonomy 
in international affairs.
U.S. Military Leverage
In the realm of military and political assistance, the story is rather si-
milar. As shown in Figure 1, the United States programmed relatively 
large levels of military training and arms sales toward Latin America 
in the early post-World War II decades, averaging $325 million per 
year over the period 1952-1960. Combined with a significant in-
telligence presence (including the Central Intelligence Agency and 
Defense Intelligence Agency), U.S. embassies were generally well 
informed regarding the attitudes and plans of senior military officers— 
and often activated their networks to influence local policy choices.14 
U.S. presidents on occasion ordered major covert interventions   which 
obtained   their   immediate the potential threats to U.S. interests po-
sed by left-leaning regimes and were blind to the risks of ‘blow back.’15
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Place Figure 1:  
U.S. Provides Significant Military Assistance to  
Latin America in Post−WWII Decades
Using Leverage to Support Democratization
The administrations of Carter and Clinton, as well as the second 
Reagan administration, undertook a major shift in U.S. policies to 
favor democracy and human rights globally. In the Southern Cone, 
President Carter’s early   human   rights   policies had a positive effect 
on goals, but which generated long-term problems for democracy and 
human rights, both in the target country and throughout the broader 
region. Notoriously, the overthrow by the CIA of Jacobo Arbenz in 
Guatemala in 1954 for daring to expropriate large U.S. agricultural 
holdings contributed to decades of bloody civil wars in that country. 
It arguably also contributed to the decision by revolutionary Cuba 
to turn to the Soviet Union for defense against the anticipated U.S. 
challenge.16 The 1973 military coup against Salvador Allende, which 
elated the Nixon White House, engendered much ill-will throughout 
the region, drove many on the left into closer alignment with Cuba 
and contributed to the anti-American mindset of generations of leftist 
politicians across the region. The leadership of the present-day ALBA 
coalition (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), sus-
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picious of U.S. motives and policies, has its ideological and political 
roots in the backlash against U.S. support for military rule in 1970s. 
In retrospect, U.S. officials over-estimated saving lives and supporting 
democracy advocates during the dark days of military dictatorships, 
even as the entrenched military governments resisted entreaties to 
relinquish power. U.S. policies on democracy and human rights made 
a contribution to this region-wide democratization if for no other 
reason than because authoritarian regimes could no longer look to 
the presumed regional hegemon for material and moral support.17 
Thereafter, examples where the United States successfully supported 
local efforts to re-establish or stabilize democratic institutions are many, 
including Chile (1989), El Salvador (early 1990s), Guatemala (1993), 
Dominican Republic (1994), Paraguay (1996) and Peru (2000), among 
others. In each of these cases, even though local democratizers pla-
yed the leading role in the successful transition from military rule, the 
United States employed combinations of carrots and sticks—often 
designed in close consultations with local and regional allies—to 
support positive outcomes.18
Decline of Traditional Leverage 
Today, the United States has far fewer levers to pull. Bilateral econo-
mic assistance programs have declined in real terms (adjusted for 
inflation)—falling from a peak of $5.2 billion in 1964 to $1.2 billion 
in 201219— and particularly in relation to the growth of the local 
economies (Figure 2). If leverage is defined in terms of the ratio of 
foreign/domestic resources, the decline is precipitous: U.S. economic 
assistance fell from 0.61 percent of Latin America’s GDP in 1965, to 
0.19 percent in 1985 to 0.02 percent in 2011. Furthermore, most econo-
mic assistance to the region is for narcotics control (Figure 3), which 
has accounted for, on average, 47 percent of U.S. economic assistance 
to Latin America since 2000.
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Figure 2:  
Falling U.S. Economic Assistance to Latin America
Similarly, military assistance today is negligible in most countries (Fi-
gure 4). In Central American nations, U.S. military aid—a mere $56 
million in 2012—accounted for less than 8 percent of domestic military 
expenditures.20 In all South American nations, U.S. military assistance 
makes up less than 1 percent of domestic military expenditure.
Figure 3:  
U.S. Economic Assistance to Latin America Declines  
as Counternarcotics Share Grows
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This is a far cry from 1960 when U.S. military assistance accounted 
for between 5 and 35 percent of South American defense budgets.21 
While the U.S. government does not publish data on the country 
allocation of intelligence resources, it is reasonable to assume intelligence 
capabilities (other than counternarcotics) are a pale reflection of those 
deployed during the height of the Alliance for Progress, particularly in 
light of competing demands for U.S. attention from other crisis-wracked 
regions of the world.
Figure 4:  
U.S. Military Aid as a Percent of  
Domestic Military Expenditure in 2012
Nicaragua 7,75%
Guatemala 5,91%
Honduras 5,34%
El Salvador 3,63%
Mexico 1,31%
Colombia 0,86%
Paraguay 0,30%
Peru 0,27%
Ecuador 0,18%
Bolivia 0,06%
Uruguay 0,06%
Argentina 0,02%
Chile 0,02%
Brazil  ~0.00%   
Venezuela 0,00%
Source: Author's elaboration based on SIPRI Military Expenditure Database and U.S. 
Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook)
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New Regional Strengths: Positive, Not Negative, Realities
Much of the contemporary U.S. policy toward the hemisphere has 
its roots in the 1990s. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the 
regional agenda became crowded with new initiatives and institutions: 
the Summit of the Americas, the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, 
a reoriented Organization of American States (OAS) focused on 
democracy promotion and a reinvigorated Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. At its core, this agenda was intended to consolidate 
and give regional institutional weight to core U.S. interests in the 
region, namely free elections, free markets, free trade and cooperative 
security. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States redoubled 
efforts to secure regional cooperation on combating terrorism and 
controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Even if some specific initiatives have run aground, such as the FTAA, 
or have been troubled, such as recent Summits, the hemispheric agenda 
of the United States has by and large been achieved. In country after 
country, international and domestic actors have aligned to produce 
the triumph of democracy and sustainable market-based economies, 
leading a wave of democratization and liberalization that has swept the 
globe since the 1970s. The region experienced its last (brief) interstate 
conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995, and the probability of war 
in Latin America is vanishingly small, an astounding achievement when 
compared to present troubles in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In 
addition, although international terrorism and proliferation have not 
vanished from the region, Latin America is far better off than any other 
part of the world on this security dimension.22
In contrast to 1980, democracy is now by and large consolidated, with 
only a few exceptions of backsliding (shown in Figure 5),23  and mi-
litary coups have become increasingly rare. Latin America’s democra-
cies have pioneered new forms of political and social inclusion, such 
as participatory budgeting and conditional cash transfer programs. 
Civil society has flourished across much of the region, and there is 
a vibrant media in many countries.
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Figure 5:  
Democracy Consolidation in Latin America
Figure 6:  
Reserve Accumulation Takes Off  
in Brazil and Mexico
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Across Latin America, we have generally witnessed stronger economic 
growth and better   macroeconomic management during the past 
decade than in the previous two. In the wake of the 1980s debt crisis, 
bouts of hyperinflation and financial crises in the 1990s, regional 
political and economic leaders   have   been   much more cautious, ac-
cumulating substantial international reserves and keeping close watch 
on inflation. By 2011, the nine largest economies in Latin America had, 
on average, accumulated reserves equivalent to 16 percent of GDP.24 
At the end of 2013, Brazil was sitting on $376 billion and Mexico on 
$177 billion (Figure 6). Inflation has fallen dramatically from over 200 
percent between 1990 and 1995 to an average of six percent since 2010.25
Figure 7:  
Sustained Income Improvements in the 2000s
This improved macroeconomic management has produced significant 
reductions in poverty and improvements in social inclusion. The size 
of the middle class in Latin America has also nearly doubled since 
2002,26 contributing to economic growth and new demands for im-
proved governance. Figure 727 illustrates the sustained GDP per capita 
growth and poverty reduction beginning in 2003, which contrast with 
the income stagnation of the 1980s and modest improvements of the 
1990s. Similarly, Figure 8 demonstrates consistent downward trends 
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in inequality in some of the region’s largest economies.28 While Latin 
America remains the most unequal region of the world,29 it is clear 
that sound macroeconomic policies have contributed to improved social 
equity, either directly through broad-based growth, or indirectly through 
enabling states to finance targeted redistributive policies.
Figure 8:  
Inequality Falls in the 2000s
The region’s rapid recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis is 
evidence of the strength of the macroeconomic policies and institu-
tions that have prevailed thus far. This has meant that much of the 
region has needed fewer loans and external assistance, and also that 
Latin American leaders have less need to adhere to external conditions 
for financial support. For example, in 2014 the Brazilian economy 
slowed down but its external reserves are so large that it does not 
need to revert to the multilateral institutions for funds or advice. 
Rather, international markets and competitive pressures are tilting 
the internal debate in Brazil toward more market-friendly policies, 
as signaled by the recent appointments of a more orthodox finance 
minister, Joaquim Levy, and market-oriented politicians to the agri-
culture and industry portfolios.
Richard Feinberg, Emily Miller and Harold Trinkunas
277
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
2
Latin America has also expanded its participation in global trade and 
its range of trading partners. In conjunction with a fall in average 
tariffs from 39 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 2005, Latin America’s 
export volume quadrupled.30 There is now a broad array of free trade 
agreements in place across the region, not only among Latin Ameri-
can states but also with China, Europe and the United States. This 
tangible multi-polarity offers nations more options for economic 
development and export-led growth. For example, growing commo-
dity exports toward China during the 2000s (Figure 9) reflects rising 
demand relative to traditional Latin American export markets such 
as Europe and the United States. Latin America’s diversified trade is 
not the “fault” of U.S. policy inattention but rather a reflection of 
structural shifts in the global economy. For Latin America, this is a 
healthy development because it reduces the risks of being tied to the 
economic prospects of any one region of the world; vulnerabilities 
of course remain, as South America depends heavily on commodity 
exports and Central America and Mexico are subject to the ups and 
downs of the U.S. economy.
Figure 9
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Inter-state peace in Latin America has become the status quo. Sta-
tes in the region rarely militarize disputes, and civil conflicts have 
declined as well; Figure 10 plots civil and international conflicts as 
measured by magnitude scores that reflect “societal-systemic impact.”31 
According to Figure 10, the only nations currently plagued by major 
episodes of civil violence are Colombia and Mexico, both drug-fueled 
conflicts.32    Even though most states in the region continue to share 
some disputed borders, such sources of friction are by and large the 
province of diplomats and lawyers arguing cases at the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague rather than of armies.33 Latin America 
has in  place  a  nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the two leading 
nuclear  technology powers, Argentina and Brazil, have a longstan-
ding non-proliferation institution,  the  Brazilian-Argentine  Agency 
for  Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials  (ABACC),   that 
monitors  their  mutual  rejection of the pursuit of nuclear weapons.34 
While fears about international terrorism in the region have occasionally 
made headlines in the United States post 9/11, the last major incidents 
occurred in 1992 and 1994 when Hezbollah agents attacked the Israeli 
Embassy and Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires. In its most recent 
report on terrorism in the region, the U.S. State Department maintained 
that the majority of terrorist attacks in Latin America were committed 
by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However such 
tactics by transnational criminal organizations and insurgents in the 
hemisphere are largely aimed at domestic audiences rather than linked 
to international terrorist networks.35
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Figure 10
The bottom line is that since the end of the Cold War, Latin America has 
advanced far and fast along a number of political, security, economic and 
social dimensions. It is impossible to untangle the relative weight of the 
external and internal factors contributing to this felicitous outcome, but it 
is safe to say that Latin American countries have made themselves much 
more democratic, peaceful and prosperous, and that past instruments of 
U.S. influence, when smartly deployed, have largely worked themselves 
out of a job. These achievements are deeply compatible with long-range 
core U.S. interests in regional peace, democracy and human rights, market-
based economies and free trade. As such, a return to a mid-20th century 
interventionist foreign policy is neither feasible nor desirable.
Problem Countries: Mostly Not Our Fault!
In spite of overall progress, there are a number of countries in Latin 
America that still face significant problems in terms of what we see as 
the four core U.S. interests in the region. We group these countries into 
two categories: (1) countries with self-inflicted policy wounds; and (2) 
countries where misguided U.S. policy choices have contributed to negative 
outcomes. Ultimately, a stronger and more autonomous Latin America 
will be better positioned to take the lead on finding solutions to ad-
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dress countries in the former category. The United States may or may 
not become positively involved in the solutions developed by countries 
in the first category, but we argue that it should certainly focus attention 
on undoing areas in which its policies have been counterproductive.
Latin American States Sometimes Make Poor Policy Choices
Argentina and Venezuela, two of the most troubled countries in the 
hemisphere today, present particularly telling examples of how poor 
policies choices by some in Latin America have undermined prospects 
for democracy and economic growth even in countries with abundant 
resources and wealth.
Since 1999, when President Hugo Chávez came to power, Venezuela 
has been the beneficiary of a remarkable boon of oil rents as the price of oil 
rose from $11 per barrel to over $110 in 2012.36 Since 95 percent of export 
earnings are derived from the sale of petroleum owned by the state, the 
result was an unprecedented increase in government revenues. This fueled 
a concentration of political power in the executive, vast expansion of 
government spending, nationalization of many domestic industries, and 
state controls on currency flows, travel and imports of consumer goods. 
These choices were made deliberately by President Chávez and his successor, 
Nicolás Maduro, in the belief that a socialist economic model would best 
improve the life of Venezuela’s poor and working class citizens. Initially, social 
inclusion improved and poverty declined. But once national oil production 
began to fall and oil prices dropped even faster, Venezuela’s economy suffe-
red from dramatic levels of scarcity, inflation over 60 percent in 2014 and a 
deepening recession.37 As its popularity declines, the government has pro-
gressively restricted political liberties, increased government influence and 
ownership of the media and placed growing restrictions on civil society. 
While President Maduro has blamed much on the United States and 
recent targeted sanctions, in practice Venezuela’s present woes are predictable 
results of fifteen years of classically populist—and unsustainable—policies 
that expanded government spending, reduced revenues and investment, 
created massive incentives for corruption and capital flight, and increased 
reliance on imports. This has produced a perfect storm as the commodity 
boom has ended and state revenues are dropping precipitously.
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Argentina has also run into economic troubles that are largely a conse-
quence of ill-conceived domestic policy choices and the end of the global 
commodity boom. In the wake of a historic default in 2001, Argentina 
underwent one of its most successful growth episodes in history. Under 
President Nestor Kirchner, domestic demand-focused policies paired 
with a growing international commodity boom produced an average 
growth rate of 8.5 percent from mid- 2002 to mid-2008.38 However, 
efforts to tax rapidly growing agricultural exports of soy, wheat and 
sunflower seeds provoked strong resistance from a powerful agricul-
tural lobby, leading to unrest in the streets and bitter partisanship 
in national politics.39 In contrast with Chile’s successful use of a sta-
bilization fund to manage booming rents from copper production, 
the Argentine government has been unable to balance the interests 
of the agricultural sector with a largely urban population. As a result, 
financial windfalls of the commodity boom were spent rather than 
saved, and growing partisanship set the stage for poor economic and 
political outcomes during the administrations that followed. Under 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the negative impact of 
waning commodity prices compounded problematic macroeconomic 
management. Surpluses have turned to deficits, reserves have dwindled 
and inflation continues to rise; frustration with corruption and crime 
has sparked protests against the government. Though government 
spending is at a 50-year high at 46 percent of GDP, this has not translated 
into an effective provision of public services or infrastructure inves-
tment.40 Fernández’s successor will be elected in October 2015 and will 
inherit no small challenge in adeptly navigating a more prosperous way 
forward. However at least a partial correction of past policy errors seems 
likely, if for no other reason than to respond to tightening resource 
constraints, as recognized by each of the major presidential aspirants.
Counternarcotics: The United States Should Stop Being Part of the 
Problem
As a counterpoint to self-destructive policies by Argentina and Venezuela’s 
leaders, the 40-year long “war on drugs” is an example of a U.S. policy 
that has done more harm than good to our relations with the region. 
Even when it made momentary advances in reducing local production 
and shipments into the United States, country recidivism was all too 
common. The so-called “balloon effect”—where temporary success in 
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one country displaces trafficking to more vulnerable  states—reflects 
how  unintended consequences frequently erased apparent gains. The 
United States has also been unwilling to address the distressing colla-
teral damage to national institutions and civic culture, which in many 
cases pushed the human costs of counternarcotics policies onto our 
neighbors in the hemisphere.
But we should be clear that Latin America shares responsibility for 
much of the criminal violence in the region, drug-related or otherwise. 
In Argentina and Brazil, for example, per capita rates of cocaine con-
sumption have been increasing steadily and at least in Brazil, are ap-
proaching parity with those of the United States.41 Choices by Mexico 
and Central America to apply “mano dura” policies to fight crime 
have contributed to rising levels of violence. The United States cannot 
fundamentally reform Latin American law enforcement or judicial 
and prison systems, nor can it cure the endemic corruption that 
makes it so difficult for some countries to undertake these reforms 
themselves. Ultimately, it requires elite commitment in each of these 
countries to undertake the institutional, policy and anti-corruption 
reform agenda that might make a meaningful difference on drug-
related criminal violence.
Consequently, the U.S. should focus on elements that are under its 
control: (1) limiting the flow of small arms toward the region, (2) 
crafting evidence-based policies designed to reduce illegal narcotics 
consumption and address public health effects in the United States, 
and (3) using targeted interdiction strategies designed to affect drug 
flows in territories within our jurisdiction or on the high seas. We can 
certainly assist Latin American states with policy, judicial, and prison 
reform efforts, particularly in Mexico and Central America. But we 
should acknowledge the need to rethink our counternarcotics policies 
so that we stop being part of the problem.42
Implications for U.S.-Latin America Relations
If many of our traditional instruments of influence are no longer 
effective or desirable, and U.S. core interests in Latin America are lar-
gely secured, and then what does this imply for future U.S. policy 
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toward the Americas? We affirm that a regional U.S. policy toward 
the Western Hemisphere still makes good sense, organized around 
bolstering our four core interests and regional institutions— such as 
the IDB, OAS, and the periodic Summits of the Americas—that 
undergird them. But beneath that broad umbrella, the United 
States needs subsets of strategies well-tailored to specific national 
circumstances. We can identify at least three groupings of states in the 
Americas, and each group has its own implications for how we develop 
U.S. foreign policy. The first is the wealthier states characterized by 
sound macroeconomic policies and vibrant democracies. The second 
is the smaller developing states, principally in Central America and 
the Caribbean, that face severe challenges on a range of domestic 
issues such as criminal violence, climate change and energy security. 
The third is the states where domestic politics have brought to power 
leaders that are not interested in cooperating with the United States.
The Prosperous Democracies
U.S. relations with the most prosperous and stable countries in the 
region (such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and 
Uruguay) should focus largely on finding areas where positive change 
can be achieved through pooled efforts. These countries are now upper-
middle-income democracies, so the incentives we can deploy, such as 
bilateral development assistance, are not available on a scale that would 
prove influential. But there are many areas for expanded collaboration 
on global governance on issues such as climate change, public health 
and international trade. These countries have significant capabilities 
and can afford to make meaningful contributions to the international 
order. In addition, there are many areas where the United States 
and Latin America have opportunities to achieve region-wide gains, 
such as in the areas of free trade, education, innovation, infrastructure 
development and energy security. In specific relationships, such as the 
one between the United States and Mexico or Central America, security 
co-operation will remain important to address criminal violence and 
illicit cross-border networks.
By far the largest economy in region, the United States can afford to 
err on the side of generosity in crafting agreements with the middle-
income countries designed to produce mutual gains. This approach 
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would accelerate the creation of a deepening web of cooperation with 
the more stable democracies in the region, much as exists with our 
closest partners and allies in the European Union and East Asia.
The Fragile Caribbean Basin
On the other hand, the vast size and wealth of the United States 
relative to Central America and the Caribbean means that positive 
instruments of diplomacy, such as development assistance and access 
to technical advice, can make a difference in states with very difficult 
domestic problems. This is particularly true for the most troubled states 
in the region, such as the violence-plagued countries of the Northern 
Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) and Haiti, which is still 
recovering from a massive earthquake in 2010. The United States can 
provide positive incentives for change as well as leadership to overcome co-
llective action problems. It has in fact experimented with this approach 
in creative initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC). Programs designed around transparent eligibility criteria, 
significant targeted assistance and evidence-based policy advice and 
evaluation will attract governments in the region committed to similar 
approaches. Governments dedicated to such progressive principles are 
the most desirable partners for the United States, and buy-in by local 
elites increases the prospects for successful policy outcomes. Similar 
principles could be applied in developing programs to foster transitions 
to a sustainable energy matrix or security sector reform. This approach 
provides countries with tools and resources to achieve positive change 
while acknowledging that governments in the region have greater 
autonomy and more options when it comes to outside assistance.
We should also note the resiliency of many of these societies in the 
face of serious challenges, and the progress that has been made. In 
the English-speaking Caribbean, social strains have not caused the 
abandonment of democratic institutions. And in Central America, 
groups on the right and the left that once turned to violence to 
respond to political and social challenges are now participating in 
more consensual democratic procedures—with occasional notable 
exceptions such as Honduras in 2009. While economic growth has 
fallen short of aspirations in some countries, social indicators have 
continued to improve throughout most of the Caribbean Basin.
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Rejectionist Leaders
We should not be overly concerned that a small number of states 
in the region are led by leaders that are not in favor of working 
with the United States. Here, our policy should be one of watchful 
patience, monitoring for the emergence of concrete threats while 
domestic politics change in due course. As we have shown throug-
hout this paper, the broad sweep of history in Latin America trends 
steadily toward democracy and free markets. One of the implications 
of democracy is that leaders will occasionally come to power who, 
for reasons of ideology or ambition, oppose the United States. Yet in 
practice the threat such countries have posed has been quite mild as 
these countries do not have the capabilities to effectively damage core
U.S. interests in the region. Ecuador and Bolivia, for example, have 
generally recognized constraints imposed by the global economy and 
geo-political realities, the rhetoric of their leaders notwithstanding. 
Even Venezuela, which could temporarily afford to ignore global eco-
nomic constraints due to vast oil wealth generated during the recent 
commodity boom, was not able to significantly reverse the regional 
trend toward democracy, free markets and free trade. Now that global 
oil prices have collapsed and Venezuela is nearing bankruptcy, even 
close allies such as Cuba are starting to tack closer to the United States 
rather than risk the side-effects of too close an association with a failing 
economy. But when necessary, we should work with stronger nations in 
the region through ad hoc coalitions to avoid violent breakdowns in 
troubled countries and most urgently, to engineer a soft landing in Cuba.
Realistic Expectations 
There are also outcomes we should not expect from our relations 
with Latin America. We should not expect that just because Latin 
American countries have by and large become more democratic and 
market-oriented that they will automatically agree with us on foreign 
policy and global governance issues. Greater macroeconomic stability, 
diversified trade patterns and democratic politics naturally translate 
into greater foreign policy autonomy. We should especially not expect 
Latin America to join in support of the more interventionist and 
confrontational aspects of U.S. global ambitions where Latin America 
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does not see its interests or domestic politics as aligned with those of the 
United States. For example, the Bush administration soured relations 
with Chile and Mexico when it pressed hard for them to support 
the 2003 Iraq invasion. Because of their historical experience (with 
the United States, in large part), Latin American countries are almost 
universally skeptical of policies that violate the sovereignty of states or 
are premised on military intervention. Thus, we should partner where 
we find consensus on common courses of action and respectfully 
manage those areas where we disagree.
This is particularly true of our relationship with Brazil which, as an 
emerging power, brings its own set of concerns to the table. In parti-
cular, Brazil seeks to shape the global order to better accommodate 
its interests, and as the seventh largest economy in the world, it has 
become a relevant player in international forums. Some elements of 
Brazil’s foreign policy establishment are particularly critical of the 
United States’ role in the world, but more broadly, many feel that the 
United States has not sufficiently acknowledged Brazil’s rise. The recent 
National Security Agency (NSA) espionage scandal particularly damaged 
bilateral relations. Internationally, Brazil has aligned with the BRICS, 
even the non-democratic ones such as China and Russia. In South Ame-
rica, it has pursued a regional integration agenda; and in competition 
with the United States and Mexico for regional influence, it has created 
institutions that deliberately exclude North America.43
These divergences between the United States and Brazil have two 
implications. First, they underline that we cannot expect U.S. policies 
based on a hemisphere-wide agenda to be fully successful given Brazil’s 
current approach foreign policy. Second, we should not pigeonhole Bra-
zil as merely a very large Latin American country, but should instead 
think of it as another rising power seeking both global and regional 
influence—alongside India, China, Russia and others—with possibly 
serious implications for the international order.
Assessing Extra-Hemispheric Risks
While vigilance is always in order, we do not see reasons today for 
becoming unduly alarmed at the role of outside powers in the region. 
Leaders from Russia and Iran, the traditional specters that have 
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haunted U.S. threat scenarios, have visited the region during the past 
decade, and trade and arms deals have been announced from time to 
time. However, cooperation with extra-regional actors has so far led to 
more smoke than substance.44 Even at the height of their commodity-
boom fueled wealth, Russia and Iran’s actions were not able to produce 
concrete effects on core U.S. security interests. The falling price of oil 
will further diminish their ability to influence the region.
As China has become wealthier and more developed, its state-
owned and private investors have looked abroad for better returns 
on their capital. Due to expanded trade ties, Latin America is a natural 
destination. Much of this investment is commercially driven; where 
it is not, as in the case of Venezuela, the Chinese are likely to learn 
the negative consequences of substituting political for market criteria 
when selecting investment partners. It is also unrealistic to expect U.S. 
overseas development assistance budgets to match the level of state-
owned enterprise investments and government loans that China 
can currently make available to the region. But there is a manner in 
which Chinese influence in the region is prejudicial to U.S. interests. 
Chinese diplomats care little for democratic institutions and Chinese 
investors too often are impervious to good governance issues such as 
fiscal transparency, environmental stewardship and international labor 
standards. The United States should therefore continue to work with 
U.S. firms, NGOs and international institutions to persuade China to 
upgrade the standards of behavior of its international investors, and to 
persuade Latin American hosts that it is not in their best interests to 
join in a competitive and destructive race to the bottom.
Burnish the Image of the United States in Latin America
There has always been a bedrock attraction for the U.S. model in La-
tin America, as public opinion polling data still supports45—and the 
United States should do what it can to bolster that positive image. 
Alas, an important threat to U.S. prestige in the Americas today is 
our own dysfunctional domestic politics. Partisan gridlock in Wash-
ington, D.C. over vital issues such as health care and climate change, 
immigration and trade are hard for many Latin Americans to grasp. 
The dark side of U.S. counter-terrorism policy post-9/11 also damaged 
Latin American perceptions of U.S. support for human rights, and 
Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
2
288
the highly unpopular Iraq invasion, perceived in Latin America as an 
unwise and illegal intervention in another developing country, further 
eroded U.S. standing in the region. The decades-long U.S. policy of 
sanctions on Cuba has been nearly universally rejected by Latin America.
The United States should do better in addressing its domestic pro-
blems which have regional implications. Executive branch officials in 
both Republican and Democratic administration have generally grasped 
the correct answers: comprehensive immigration reform, energy coope-
ration and expanded commercial relations. However, the increasingly 
fractured U.S. political structure—with its extreme bureaucratic checks 
and balances in the interagency process and far too many veto points 
on Capitol Hill and in the judiciary—has blocked or slowed progress 
on each of these initiatives.
These domestic and foreign policy flaws detract from U.S. prestige, 
and this is not something that can be solved by “more attention” 
or better public relations. Alas, it is not that “we have this great story 
to tell, we just need to tell it better.” For the story itself has become 
somewhat less appealing in the 21st century, which is a much deeper 
problem than deficits in diplomacy. Many Latin Americans know us too 
well and they see us for what we are, not as we would like to appear to 
be. All the more reason to address those elements at home that have 
lessened the U.S. power of attraction, while recognizing the positive 
trends in the region and building upon emerging opportunities to 
work together.
Toward a 21st Century Inter-American Relationship
Felicitously, in recent years, the United States has moved toward a 
more mature relationship with the states in the Americas. The Oba-
ma administration has already begun addressing some of the major 
irritants that have damaged U.S. prestige in recent years and retarded 
improvement in U.S.-Latin America relations, including immigration, 
freer trade and U.S.-Cuba relations. At the same time, the end of 
the commodity export boom is likely to take the economic wind out 
of the sails of some of the loudest anti-American voices in the region, 
and renew the focus of all commodity exporters on macroeconomic 
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stability and more sustainable economic development. Central Ame-
rica, the Caribbean and Mexico, closely tied to the United States by 
trade and investment, are likely to see improved growth prospects as 
the U.S. economy accelerates. Taken together, this signals that we are 
at a potential turning point for relations between the United States 
and the rest of the hemisphere, an excellent time to take stock and look 
closely at the effectiveness of existing policies.
The Obama administration’s dramatic shift in policies toward Cuba 
illuminates the wisdom of reconsidering long-held policies and beliefs. 
The ruling Cuban Communist Party—the one remaining holdout from 
the Cold War in the Americas— recognized that its drive to modernize 
its economy requires more normal and respectful relations with the 
United States. Following the facts, as President Obama put it, Cuba will 
likely be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism (indeed, 
Cuba is hosting the talks aimed at ending the decades-long civil war in 
Colombia) and its security forces keep a tight lid on criminal activities at 
home, which creates a hostile environment for international criminal 
syndicates. As Cuba gradually evolves, can anyone doubt that the 
economy will become more open and market-oriented, something 
that would benefit core U.S. interests?
Given the evolution of Latin America and of the United States’ role 
in the region, we should frame our policies as follows:
1. Target our policies toward Latin America to focus on colla-
boration on global governance with the upper-middle income 
countries, technical assistance for the fragile states of the Ca-
ribbean Basin, and watchful patience with rejectionist leaders 
as we wait for history to take its course.
2. Acknowledge the lack of a hemispheric consensus on many issues 
and focus on ad-hoc coalitions of partners. The Summit of the 
Americas may survive as a platform for building relationships 
and might occasionally yield tangible accords, but we should 
not expect it to produce a common comprehensive agenda.
3. Rethink and retarget our problematic counternarcotics policies, 
both to rebalance away from their dominance in the assis-
tance agenda to Latin America and to focus on dimensions of 
the problem that fall under U.S. jurisdiction and control.
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4. Extend the principle of evidence-based programs, systematically 
evaluated based on transparent metrics, to other dimensions 
of our economic and security assistance to the region.
5. Manage the challenges posed by our relationship with Brazil 
within a broader framework designed to promote constructi-
ve contributions by all rising powers to a stable and peaceful 
international order.
6. Ensure that China’s inevitable economic presence in the region 
contributes positively to Latin America’s development without 
eroding hard-won political and social gains.
The bottom line is that we should keep in mind a few simple wis-
doms for navigating this complex age. We should acknowledge the 
heartening successes of our policy toward Latin America over the past 
three decades. But we must adapt our instruments of diplomacy 
for the 21st century, focus on core interests—democracy, markets, 
international peace and an absence of terrorism or proliferation—and 
address the crises of the moment from the proper perspective. We 
should be mindful of areas where our highly polarized domestic 
politics damage our image abroad, and seek out creative compromises 
that also bolster inter-American relations. Where real problems exist 
in the Americas, the United States needs to better understand the 
underlying root causes; we should devote our energies to problems 
over which we may have some positive impact and accept that many 
will be best addressed by increasingly capable Latin American states. 
Likewise, we should expect and encourage Latin America to actively 
contribute to resolving critical issues in global governance. In the 
hands of diplomats with a firm grip on the true trends dominating 
the Western Hemisphere, this positive vision of future U.S.-Latin 
American relations is a likely but no means certain outcome and U.S. 
policymakers should work toward transforming it into reality.
Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its 
absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities 
supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and 
recommendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any 
donation.
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